










“Admissibilidade da prova no processo penal: entre a busca pela 
verdade, os direitos humanos e a eficiência do procedimento”
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AbstrAct: Many legal systems have adopted rules that lead to 
the exclusion of evidence that has been obtained in violation of 
procedural rules. Exclusion normally occurs before the trial begins or 
even during trial. However, the majority of criminal cases are today 
not resolved through a full trial but by some kind of abbreviated 
procedure, e.g., through a guilty plea or a written penal order. In 
this article, the author claims that exclusionary rules should, by and 
large, also apply in such abbreviated proceedings. Practical obstacles 
could be overcome by a more active involvement of defense counsel 
in abbreviated proceedings.
Keywords: abbreviated proceedings; exclusionary rule; guilty plea; 
penal order.
resumo: Muitos sistemas jurídicos adotaram normas que acarretam a exclusão 
de provas que tenham sido obtidas com violação a regras procedimentais. A 
exclusão normalmente ocorre antes do início do processo ou mesmo durante 
o seu transcorrer. Contudo, a maioria dos casos criminais atualmente não são 
resolvidos por meio de um processo completo, mas por alguma espécie de 
procedimento abrevia, por exemplo, um acordo penal ou uma ordem penal em 
procedimento por decreto. Neste artigo, sustenta-se que as normas de exclusão 
probatória devem ser amplamente aplicadas em procedimentos abreviados. 
1 Professor emeritus, University of Cologne, Germany. Dr. jur. (University of 
Freiburg, Germany).
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Obstáculos práticos podem ser superados por um envolvimento mais ativo 
da defesa técnica nos procedimentos abreviados.
PAlAvrAs-chAve: procedimentos abreviados; ilicitude probatória; acordos 
penais; ordem penal por decreto.
i. IntroductIon
The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence means that the relevant 
information or items cannot be presented at the trial and the judgment 
must not be based on them. In recent decades, however, a full trial has in 
many jurisdictions become a statistically exceptional way of disposing of 
criminal cases.2 This fact raises the question whether exclusionary rules 
are relevant if a case is disposed of without trial. If a criminal case takes 
a “shortcut to justice”, does inadmissibility of evidence still play a role?
In this article, I do not intend to deal with this question from 
the perspective of a single legal system but will attempt to elaborate on 
the general function of exclusionary rules in abbreviated procedures and 
will suggest possible solutions.
ii. criMinal JusticE without trial
If a case goes to trial, it is normally the court that rules on the 
admissibility of evidence that may be subject to exclusion. Many legal 
systems have, however, implemented ways of sanctioning offenders 
without holding a full trial on the charges. There exists a broad array of 
such abbreviated proceedings in different jurisdictions.3 In some countries, 
2 For example, in Germany only 10% of cases reported to the police with a known 
suspect are eventually brought to trial. Whereas 73% of the reported cases are 
dismissed for insignificance or lack of sufficient evidence, 16% are disposed 
of through abbreviated proceedings. See Thomas Weigend, No News is Good 
News: Criminal Sentencing in Germany since 2000, in: Michael Tonry (ed.), 
Sentencing Policies and Practice in Western Countries, pp. 83-106 (2016) at 92. 
3 For an overview see Gwladys Gilliéron, Comparing Plea Bargaining and Ab-
breviated Trial Procedures, in: Darryl K. Brown, Jenia I. Turner and Bettina 
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for example in England and the United States,4 the defendant’s formal 
plea of guilty (often entered after negotiations with the prosecution) 
obviates the need for the taking of evidence in court. Other jurisdictions 
provide for the option of mini trials in which a judge takes cognizance of 
the results of the police investigation, any statement of the defendant, and 
possibly the testimony of individual witnesses and passes judgment on that 
basis.5 Another option is a written judgment issued by the judge based on 
a proposal of the prosecutor, which becomes final unless the defendant 
files an objection within a short period of time.6 Germany provides for the 
option of a “regular” trial in which the defendant’s confession provides 
a shortcut to conviction and the imposition of a sentence that has been 
agreed upon previously.7 Some countries, like Brazil, prefer to permit 
formal conviction only on the basis of a trial but provide for informal 
sanctioning by way of conditional dismissal of prosecution.8
If any of such abbreviated proceedings are employed, the question 
arises whether illegally obtained evidence that would be subject to 
exclusion at trial may be taken into consideration for the disposition 
of the case.
iii. two casE scEnarios
Two case scenarios may demonstrate the problem:
Case 1 - Pillow talk: S is suspected of dealing with illegal drugs. 
Without the required judicial warrant, the police secretly install a hidden 
Weißer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Process, 2019, pp. 703-727.
4 See Jenia I. Turner, Plea Bargaining Across Borders, pp. 7-72 (2009); Mary 
Vogel, Plea Bargaining under the Common Law, in: Darryl K. Brown, Jenia I. 
Turner and Bettina Weißer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Pro-
cess, 2019, pp. 729-760.
5 See, e.g., Art. 438 et seq. Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (Giudizio 
abbreviato).
6 See, e.g., Arts. 495 – 495-6 French Code of Criminal Procedure (Ordonnance 
pénale).
7 See § 257c German Code of Criminal Procedure (Verständigung).
8 Brazilian Lei 9.099/95 Art. 89 (suspensão condicional do processo); see also 
§ 153a German Code of Criminal Procedure.
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microphone in S’s bedroom and put all conversations on tape. Talking to 
his wife, S mentions that he received a shipment of cocaine and put it in the 
garage. Based on this taped conversation, the police break into S’s garage 
the next day and confiscate a small amount of cocaine. S is indicted for the 
illegal sale of controlled substances. He agrees to have his case resolved 
in an abbreviated proceeding operational in the relevant jurisdiction. In 
this procedure, the prosecution offers the evidence collected during the 
investigation to a single judge, who affords S the opportunity to be heard. 
S elects to remain silent, and the judge then proceeds directly to judgment, 
basing S’s conviction and sentence on the cocaine found in his garage. 
Case 2 - The burglar’s confession: S is suspected of having committed 
a burglary. Police officer P arrests him and interrogates him in the police 
station in the absence of a lawyer. When S denies his involvement in the 
burglary, P says that he and his colleagues have certain means to make him 
talk, implying physical violence. S thereupon confesses to the crime. The 
prosecutor files an indictment, charging S with armed burglary. Shortly 
before trial, S’s defense lawyer D approaches the prosecutor and asks for 
a “deal”. The prosecutor mentions that S had already confessed to the 
crime at the police station and therefore declines to reduce the charge; 
but she offers not to oppose the lawyer’s request for a lenient sentence 
if S accepts his responsibility in court. In a judicial hearing, S formally 
admits his guilt. Based on the admission of guilt, S is convicted of armed 
burglary and receives a lengthy prison sentence.
It may be assumed that the key evidence (the cocaine in Case 1 
and the confession in Case 2) would be inadmissible at a trial because 
of serious violations of S’s procedural rights.9 But does the fact that the 
evidence was obtained illegally also invalidate the convictions of S in the 
special procedures used? In addressing this question, I will first briefly 
recall the rationales for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. In 
a second step, I will ask whether these rationales apply to abbreviated 
procedures and to dispositions without trial. Since the answer will – with 
9 Since the cocaine in Case 1 is evidence only derived from the illegal tap-
ing of the conversation between S and his wife, not every jurisdiction may 
provide for automatic exclusion. However, given the blatant violation of S’s 
privacy it may be safe to assume that most judges would exclude the cocaine 
from the trial.
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some qualifications – be in the affirmative, the final step of this article 
will be to look for impediments to exclusion of evidence in abbreviated 
procedures and for ways to overcome these obstacles.
iv. rationalEs for Excluding EvidEncE
A vast amount of literature has dealt with the rationale of the 
“exclusionary rule”.10 The starting point for the relevant considerations 
is the fact that “excluding” evidence reduces the factual basis of the 
court’s judgment and thus interferes with the court’s mission of finding 
the “truth” and basing the judgment on that finding.11 Excluding relevant 
evidence with probative value creates an obstacle to truth-finding and 
must therefore be regarded as an exception, especially since exclusion 
is often based on extra-procedural interests.12 
10 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 Harvard Journal of Law 
and Public Policy 111-118 (2003); Kai Ambos, Beweisverwertungsverbote, 
2010; Stephen C. Thaman (ed.) Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law 
(2013); Jenia I. Turner, The Exclusionary Rule as a Symbol of the Rule of 
Law, 67 SMU Law Review 821–833 (2014); Christopher Slobogin, A Com-
parative Perspective on the Exclusonary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 
in: Jacqueline Ross and Stephen Thaman (eds.), Comparative Criminal Pro-
cedure (2016), pp. 280-308; Jenia I. Turner, Limits on the Search for Truth 
in Criminal Procedure: A Comparative View, ibid., pp. 35-73; Sabine Gless 
and Thomas Richter (eds.), Do Exclusionary Rules Ensure a Fair Trial?, 
2019; Shawn Boyne, Truth or Justice: A Comparative Look at the Exclusion-
ary Rule in Germany and the United States, in: Arnd Sinn et al. (eds.), Pop-
ulismus und alternative Fakten – (Straf-)Rechtswissenschaft in der Krise? 
(2020), pp. 19-46.
11 See Stephen C. Thaman, Balancing Truth against Human Rights, in: Stephen 
C. Thaman (ed.), Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law, 2013, pp. 403-446; 
Jenia I. Turner, Regulating Interrogations and Excluding Confessions in the 
United States, in: Sabine Gless and Thomas Richter (eds.), Do Exclusionary 
Rules Ensure a Fair Trial? Springer Open 2019, p. 93 at 104-107 (citing exam-
ples of “balancing” from United States case law).
12 See German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 7 Dec. 2011, 2 BvR 
2500/09, 2 BvR 1857/10, 130 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungs-
gerichts 1, marginal notes 111-115; German Federal Court of Justice, Judg-
ment of 13 Jan. 2011, 3 StR 332/10, 56 Entscheidungen des Bundesgericht-
shofes in Strafsachen 127 at 132.
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Three main rationales have been suggested to justify the exclusion 
of evidence:
(1) Deterrence of police misconduct
(2) Protection / vindication of suspects’ procedural rights
(3) Maintaining the integrity of court proceedings.13
The first two of these considerations look backward to the 
violation of legal rules that has occurred and aim at providing some 
kind of compensation. The police officer is “punished” for his fault by 
being told that the illegally obtained evidence is ignored by the court 
and – in the extreme case – that the defendant is acquitted for lack of 
sufficient other evidence. At the same time, the police officer and his 
colleagues are expected to realize that a violation of procedural rules 
“doesn’t pay” and that it is better to act lawfully in the future.14 With 
regard to the defendant, in most cases the violation of his rights (the right 
to privacy in Case 1 and the privilege against forced self-incrimination 
in Case 2) cannot be undone. But the exclusion of evidence may give 
him a double (immaterial) compensation. The decision to exclude the 
results of the illegal act from the evidence implies a judicial finding that 
his rights were violated; and at the same time exclusion reduces the risk 
that he is convicted.15 
Both of these rationales generally provide a legitimate basis for 
excluding evidence, but the consequences may appear excessive if the 
violation of procedural law was not grievous and if the exclusion of the 
13 For a comparative overview of the use and problems of these rationales see 
Jenia I. Turner and Thomas Weigend, The Purposes and Functions of Exclu-
sionary Rules, in: Sabine Gless and Thomas Richter (eds.), Do Exclusionary 
Rules Ensure a Fair Trial? pp. 255-282 (2019). A brief comparative account 
of rationales for the exclusion of evidence can also be found in Yukun Zong, 
Beweisverwertungsverbote im Strafverfahren, 2018, pp. 447-458.
14 See Yvonne Marie Daly, Judicial Oversight of Policing: Investigations, Evidence 
and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 Crime, Law and Social Change 199-215 (2011); 
referring to Swiss law see Sabine Gless and Jeannine Martin, Water Always 
Finds Its Way, in: Michele Caianiello and Jaqueline S. Hodgson (eds.), Discre-
tionary Criminal Justice in a Comparative Context, 2015, 159-184 at 171.
15 For a more thorough analysis see Andrew Ashworth, Excluding Evidence as 
Protecting Rights, 3 Criminal Law Review 723-735 (1977).
253
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 1, p. 247-271, jan.-abr. 2021. 
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v7i1.502 |
particular piece of evidence means that the defendant will have to be 
acquitted in a case of serious crime. In addition, it is not self-understood 
that exclusion of evidence will indeed have a positive impact on future 
police conduct. Any positive effect depends on several conditions, e.g., 
whether the police officer in question learns of the exclusion and whether 
he cares about the outcome of the trial after the case has been “cleared” 
for the purposes of the police.16 This potential excessiveness explains the 
rule in some jurisdictions that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is 
not automatic but should depend on a balancing of the interests of the 
individual that was wronged against the interests of law enforcement. 
Exclusion will then be ordered only if it is more important, in the 
individual case, to vindicate the defendant’s procedural rights and to 
deter the police from repeating the fault than to convict the defendant 
of the crime charged.17 On the other hand, permitting the court to 
perform this balancing operation introduces an element of vagueness 
and unpredictability into the process. This also reduces the deterrent 
effect, because the police may be encouraged to employ illicit methods 
and hope for a “favorable” outcome of the balancing process and the 
eventual admission of the incriminating evidence.
16 For a seminal analysis see Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the 
Exclusionary Rule, 32 Emory Law Journal 937 at 947-959 (1983). For fur-
ther discussion see Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the 
Exclusionary Rule, 1999 University of Illinois Law Review 363-446; Drury 
D. Stevenson, Entrapment and the Problem of Deterring Police Misconduct, 
37 Connecticut Law Review 67 at 77-79 (2004); Kit Kinports, Culpability, 
Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 William and Mary Bill of Rights 
Journal 821-856 (2013). For empirical findings on deterring police miscon-
duct see Christopher J. Harris and Robert E. Worden, The Effect of Sanctions 
on Police Misconduct, 60 Crime & Delinquency 1258-1288 (2014). 
17 For Germany, see Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 13 May 2015, 
2 BvR 616/13, marginal notes 41, 42; Federal Court of Justice, Judgment of 
21 Feb. 1964, 4 StR 519/63, 19 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes 
in Strafsachen 325; Lutz Meyer-Goßner and Bertram Schmitt, Strafproz-
essordnung, 63rd ed. 2020, Einleitung marginal note 55a. For Austria, see 
§ 166 subsec. 1 no. 2 Code of Criminal Procedure (illegally obtained state-
ments of the accused or of a witness must not be used as evidence “if exclu-
sion is indispensable for compensating for the violation”). But see Art. 171 
§ 6 Polish Code of Criminal Procedure (absolutely excluding statements of 
the accused or of a witness made under conditions precluding the possibil-
ity of free expression).
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But what, then, about the third rationale, i.e., maintaining the 
integrity of court proceedings?18 This aspect does not aim at making up for 
past faults but focuses on the present trial. Assume that there is a written 
confession in Case 2 and that there are blood stains on the document as 
a result of a severe beating of the defendant by the interrogating officer. 
Wouldn’t it run counter to the concept of a court of law to use this 
confession as evidence? The same notion may apply in the Case 1 situation: 
Will a court of law be willing to use evidence that was obtained through 
illegally eavesdropping on the defendant’s bedroom conversation with 
his wife? This rationale for excluding evidence has the advantage of not 
being based on extra-procedural concerns; it promotes the intrinsic goal of 
conducting a fair process. It must be conceded, however, that the “integrity 
of the court” approach, like the proportionality balancing mentioned 
above, does not have clear contours. It is theoretically conceivable to 
claim that any procedural fault so taints the ensuing evidence that a 
court should not use it. But that argument is difficult to maintain if the 
fault was technical and unintentional, for example, a search based on a 
judicial warrant the temporal validity of which had just expired. Thus, 
if the seriousness of the procedural fault determines the admissibility of 
evidence under this rationale, a normative judgment is necessary and a 
measure of uncertainty again enters the legal analysis.
Summing up, it appears that exclusionary rules are undergirded 
by a number of concurring rationales. They have in common that they 
provide a strong basis for excluding evidence obtained by means of serious 
violations of important procedural rights. They leave open, however, a 
gray area of minor or merely technical violations of procedural rules, 
where exclusion of important evidence may not be warranted under all 
circumstances, especially if the piece of evidence in question is crucial 
for the determination of the truth. 
18 For analysis of this rationale see Robert M. Bloom and David H. Fentin, ‘A 
More Majestic Conception’, 13 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Consti-
tutional law 47-80 (2010); Jenia I. Turner, The Exclusionary Rule as a Symbol 
of the Rule of Law, 67 SMU Law Review 821-833 (2014); Hock Lai Ho, The 
Fair Trial Rationale for Excluding Wrongfully Obtained Evidence, in: Sabine 
Gless and Thomas Richter (eds.), Do Exclusionary Rules Ensure a Fair Trial? 
pp. 283-305 (2019). See also the practitioner’s perspective on this issue by 
Susanne Knickmeier, ibid. pp. 329-347.
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v. abbrEviatEd forMs of disposing of criMinal casEs
1. generAl APPlIcAbIlIty of exclusIonAry rules
Let us now turn to the question of whether exclusionary rules 
may or should be applied in abbreviated proceedings. If we consider the 
various rationales of exclusionary rules, it appears obvious that there 
exists no persuasive reason for limiting their applicability to cases in 
which a full trial takes place. Any such limitation would diminish the 
incentive for police to abide by procedural law, because they could hope 
that the evidence obtained illegally could lead to the conviction of the 
suspect in an abbreviated proceeding. There would be no vindication or 
compensation for the violation of the suspect’s rights. And if a sanction 
is imposed on the suspect in a criminal process, the officials involved 
in that proceeding would have to take into account the tainted piece of 
evidence, thereby putting into doubt the legitimacy and integrity of the 
process. If the rationales of the exclusionary rule apply to abbreviated 
proceedings, so should the exclusionary rule itself. In fact, any evidence 
that is inadmissible at trial should be instantly removed from the process. 
Ideally, such evidence would not only be inadmissible in any court 
proceeding but prosecutors should also disregard it when deciding on 
whether to file an indictment. 
By extending a strict exclusionary rule to abbreviated proceedings, 
however, the problem of reducing the factual basis of the decision is 
transferred to these proceedings. In other words, the (remaining) truth-
orientation of abbreviated criminal procedures is damaged inasmuch as 
relevant evidence is removed from the consideration of the decision-
maker. To reduce this problem, the arguments in favor of exclusion of 
tainted evidence should be weighed against the interest in basing the 
decision on an approximation to the “real” facts of the case. This leads to 
a further complication, however: A proper balancing of interests can take 
place only at the trial stage, when all facts about the violation have been 
disclosed and it has become clear to what extent the evidence in question 
is needed for arriving at a fair disposition of the case. Yet, the prosecutor 
must make her decision on a provisional factual basis and without the 
benefit of argument from the defense. Under these circumstances, it is 
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not unethical for a prosecutor to rely on evidence of doubtful legality 
and present it in court, waiting to see whether the defense objects and 
what the judge’s ruling may be. 
2. dIfferent tyPes of AbbrevIAted ProceedIngs
For assessing the operation of the exclusionary rule in abbreviated 
proceedings, it is useful to take a closer look at the existing variants of 
such proceedings, which all have in common that a sanction is imposed 
on the offender without a complete presentation of all relevant evidence 
in a public trial.19 Given the vast array of different criminal proceedings 
without a full trial, there is no point in making general statements about 
“the” abbreviated criminal process. Yet, we can distinguish three basic 
types of abbreviated proceedings: 
(a) ProsEcutorial sanctioning
Forms of prosecutorial sanctioning can be found in many legal 
systems. Although prosecutors normally cannot make formal findings 
of guilt and cannot impose criminal punishment, they dispose of tools 
such as deferred prosecution, conditional dismissal of charges, informal 
probation, and so-called transactions.20 They all have in common that a 
sanction of some kind (a fine, a compensation payment to the victim, 
or a probation-type set of obligations) is imposed on a suspect with his 
consent; if the obligation is fulfilled, there will be no formal prosecution 
and trial. The obligation imposed on the suspect can only be interpreted 
19 On the worldwide spread of abbreviated procedures see Máximo Langer, 
From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bar-
gaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 Harvard 
International Law Journal (2004), pp. 1-62.
20 See, e.g., Art. 216bis Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure (“transaction” be-
tween prosecutor and suspect over payment of money for dismissal of prose-
cution); Brazilian Lei 9.099/95 Art. 89 (suspensão condicional do processo); 
Art. 167 sec. 2 Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure; § 153a German Code of 
Criminal Procedure (conditional dismissal of prosecution); Art. 342 Polish 
Code of Criminal Procedure (conditional discontinuance of prosecution).
257
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 1, p. 247-271, jan.-abr. 2021. 
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v7i1.502 |
as a response to the offense he is alleged to have committed although his 
guilt has not been proved in court. In this type of proceeding, there is no 
presentation of evidence and no formal hearing. Still the question remains 
to what extent the prosecutor needs a factual basis for her decision and 
how that factual basis can be created.21
(b) formal accEPtancE of guilt
The second type of abbreviated proceedings can be exemplified 
by the “guilty plea” typical of the Anglo-American criminal process.22 
In accordance with a long common law tradition, the defendant at the 
beginning of the judicial process is asked to declare whether he is guilty 
or not guilty. If his plea is “guilty” and if the judge accepts the plea after 
a summary examination of its voluntariness and its “factual basis”,23 no 
evidence concerning the defendant’s guilt will be presented in court; his 
formal declaration is regarded as a sufficient basis for the court’s finding 
of guilt. The court will then proceed directly to sentencing the defendant. 
The defendant’s plea of guilty is often preceded by negotiations between 
the prosecutor and the defense lawyer. The prosecutor will usually offer 
some incentive for the defendant to plead guilty, such as a reduction of 
the original charges or a recommendation for a lenient sentence. On the 
21 In Germany, commentators demand only suspicion sufficient for filing an 
indictment; Herbert Diemer, in: Rolf Hannich (ed.), Karlsruher Kommentar 
zur Strafprozessordnung, 8th ed. 2019, § 153a marginal note 11; Lutz Mey-
er-Goßner and Bertram Schmitt, Strafprozessordnung, 63rd ed. 2020, § 153a 
marginal note 7. 
22 For overviews see Jacqueline Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargain-
ing in United States Legal Practice, 54 American Journal of Comparative Law 
717-732 (2006); Jenia I. Turner, Plea Bargaining across Borders, 2009, pp. 
7-72 (U.S.); Stephen Thaman, World Plea Bargaining (2010); Marc L. Mill-
er, Ronald F. Wright, Jenia I. Turner, and Kay Levine, Criminal Procedures: 
Prosecution and Adjudication, 6th ed. 2019, pp. 309-396.
23 In the United States, the “factual basis” is normally “examined” perfunctorily, 
and in some States judges rely on a mere written declaration that such a basis 
exists. See Tina M. Zottoli et al., State of the States: A Survey of Statutory 
Law, Regulations and Court Rules Pertaining to Guilty Pleas Across the Unit-
ed States, 37 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 388-434 (2019). 
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other hand, the prosecutor may point out that a very severe sentence 
might be imposed if the defendant goes to trial and is found guilty. 
In other legal systems, where the notion of “pleading guilty” 
has not been established, a functional equivalent is a joint motion of 
the prosecutor and the defendant to the judge for the imposition of 
an agreed-upon sentence.24 The judge is typically free to accept or 
reject the proposal. In the latter case, a trial will be held unless another 
disposition can be found. As in the guilty plea system of the common 
law jurisdictions, no evidence is taken in court, but the acceptance of 
the sanction by the defendant is seen as a sufficient legitimization of the 
proposed disposition.25 
(c) PEnal ordErs and mini trials 
The common denominator of the third type of abbreviated 
proceedings is the fact that the defendant’s conviction is based on the 
results of the pretrial investigation. This kind of disposition can take 
several forms. One common sub-type is the so-called penal order26: The 
prosecutor drafts a judgment including a sentence based on the police file 
of the investigation. The draft order is then forwarded to a single judge, 
who can sign or reject it.27 If the judge approves and signs the order, it 
24 See, e.g., Arts. 495-7 – 495-16 French Code of Criminal Procedure (com-
parution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité); Art. 335 Polish Code 
of Criminal Procedure.
25 In other jurisdictions, negotiated dispositions are limited to cases in which 
the defendant is willing to provide incriminating evidence on other offend-
ers; see Brazilian Law 12.850/2013. Although the vocabulary of “guilty plea” 
is used in this connection, the dismissal or reduction of charges here is not 
tied to an acceptance of responsibility but to aiding in the prosecution of 
other suspects. 
26 See, e.g., Arts. 495 – 495-6 French Code of Criminal Procedure (ordonnance 
pénale); §§ 407-412 German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafbefehl).
27 In the Netherlands, the prosecutor himself issues the penal order; the de-
fendant can however file an objection and thereby have the case transferred 
to the District Court for trial. Penal orders cannot include a prison sen-
tence (Arts. 257a et seq. Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure). For similar 
proceedings (prosecutorial penalty writ) in Norway see Sections 255 et seq. 
Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act. On the practice of penal orders and its 
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becomes final and acquires the effect of a regular court judgment unless 
the defendant files an objection or appeal in due course. In case of an 
objection, the matter is set for trial in court. The penal order’s main 
field of application is minor offenses, for example, small theft and traffic 
violations. The sentence to be imposed by penal order is typically limited 
to non-custodial sanctions (including conditional prison sentences). 
Another sub-type is a summary trial before a judge with only 
a minimum of evidence-taking, or with none at all. For example, in 
Italy the judge can, with the defendant’s consent, proceed to a giudizio 
abbreviato.28 In that proceeding, the judgment can be based on the file 
of the prosecutorial investigation, but the judge may also interrogate 
individual witnesses if she deems that necessary for coming to a firm 
conclusion about the defendant’s guilt or innocence.29 In the Norwegian 
abbreviated trial, the judge holds a hearing with only the defendant present 
and passes sentence immediately after the defendant has confessed to 
the facts named in the indictment.30 In either case, the incentive for 
the defendant to submit to the abbreviated disposition of the case is a 
sentence reduction.31 
Germany has a similar type of disposition which is, however, 
dressed up as a formal trial.32 In the Verständigung procedure, the defense 
lawyer and the judge(s) of the trial court conduct negotiations before the 
problems see Marc Blotwijk and Michael Fernandez-Bertier, Out-of-Court 
Criminal Dispute Resolution in the Netherlands, Belgium and the U.S., Tijd-
schrift voor Sanctierecht & Onderneming 2015, 95-107 at 98. 
28 Arts. 438 et seq. Italian Code of Criminal Procedure.
29 Art. 441 subsec. 5 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. The defendant may 
also propose evidence to be taken; Art. 441bis subsec. 5 Italian Code of 
Criminal Procedure.
30 Art. 248 Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act.
31 See Art. 442 subsec. 2 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (sentence for petty 
offenses is reduced by half, sentence for other offenses is reduced by one third).
32 For a comparison of the German Verständigung procedure with guilty plea 
proceedings in England and the United States see Jenia I. Turner and Thomas 
Weigend, Negotiated Case Dispositions in Germany, England, and the Unit-
ed States, in: Kai Ambos, Antony Duff, Julian Roberts and Thomas Weigend 
(eds.), Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol. I, Cam-
bridge 2020, pp. 389-427.
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beginning of (or sometimes during) the trial. The judge, who is familiar 
with the file of the pretrial investigation, makes a “predictive” offer of 
imposing a sentence within a certain range if the defendant comes forward 
with a confession at the trial.33 If both sides agree and the prosecutor 
does not veto the deal, the court is bound by the offer.34 The trial then 
begins with the defendant making the confession as agreed, and the court 
may (but often does not) take additional evidence.35 If everything goes 
according to plan, the defendant then receives the agreed-upon sentence 
and the case is closed.36
The feature that differentiates this type of a “shortcut to justice” 
from the guilty plea is the fact that the defendant’s consent is not the 
sole legitimating basis for a finding of guilt. The court relies on the file 
containing the results of the pretrial investigation,37 on the defendant’s 
confession, on additional witness testimony, or on a combination of 
all three. In any event, there is supposed to exist a sufficiently reliable 
factual basis for the judgment even though no regular trial has been held. 
vi.  thE rolE of Exclusion of EvidEncE in abbrEviatEd 
procEEdings
Having obtained an overview of various types of sanctioning options 
without a full trial, we may return to the question of whether exclusionary 
rules should play a role in such proceedings. We can again distinguish among 
the three types of abbreviated procedures as defined above.
33 § 257c subsec. 3 German Code of Criminal Procedure.
34 § 257c subsec. 3 sent. 4 German Code of Criminal Procedure.
35 § 257c subsec. 1 sent. 2 German Code of Criminal Procedure obliges the 
court to introduce all evidence that can be relevant for its decision. In prac-
tice, however, courts often regard the defendant’s confession as a sufficient 
basis of the judgment. 
36 For a recent empirical study on the practice of Verständigung see Karsten 
Altenhain, Matthias Jahn, Jörg Kinzig, Die Praxis der Verständigung im Straf-
prozess, 2020.
37 The court must not base the judgment directly on the file of the pretrial in-
vestigation. But the professional judges will have read the file before the start 
of the trial and obtain from it a certain preconception of the facts of the case.
261
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 1, p. 247-271, jan.-abr. 2021. 
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v7i1.502 |
1. ProsecutorIAl sentencIng
With regard to prosecutorial sanctioning, we can start from the 
rule (developed above) that the prosecutor should not base her decisions 
on evidence that would not be admissible in court. Consequently, proposals 
for conditional dismissal or pretrial probation and similar sanctioning 
mechanisms should be made only if the prosecutor can reasonably expect 
to obtain a conviction at trial based on admissible evidence. If the evidence, 
minus those items that are likely to be excluded, is not sufficient to prove 
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it would be oppressive 
to propose to the suspect to fulfill certain obligations (such as paying a 
fine) although he would probably be acquitted if the prosecutor brought 
the case to trial. So, in the example Case 2, if the prosecutor does not have 
much evidence for the defendant’s involvement in the burglary beyond 
the inadmissible confession, it would be unethical for her to make the 
defendant an offer to dismiss his case if he made a payment or provided 
several hours of unpaid work in a public interest project. It is conceivable 
that the defendant might still accept the offered disposition in order to get 
rid of the threat of prosecution or because he wishes to atone for a moral 
wrong he committed; but the prosecutor should at least candidly tell the 
defendant that there is a low likelihood that he would be convicted at trial. 
As mentioned above, however, the prosecutor has some leeway 
if the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence is dependent on a 
balancing of the seriousness of the procedural violation against the 
interest in truth-finding in the criminal process. Since this balancing must 
in the last resort be undertaken by the court based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the prosecutor may act on a reasonable possibility that 
the evidence will eventually be admitted. She may therefore make the 
suspect an offer for, e.g., deferred prosecution or conditional dismissal 
even though she cannot be certain that some illegally obtained evidence 
would be admitted by the trial court. 
2. formAl AccePtAnce of guIlt
If the defendant enters a guilty plea or accepts a finding of 
guilt without prior evidence-taking, his declaration, as we have seen, 
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is regarded as a sufficient basis for conviction. Since no evidence is 
presented to the court, exclusionary rules logically do not have a direct 
effect on the proceedings following the guilty plea. But does that mean 
that grave procedural violations that occurred in the investigation phase 
become irrelevant if the defendant accepts the prosecutor’s offer to 
plead guilty to a reduced charge or in exchange for a recommendation 
of a lenient sentence? It is not quite so simple. First, as we have seen 
above, the prosecutor should not base her charging decision on clearly 
inadmissible evidence. That rule also extends to decisions concerning 
the plea bargaining process. Consequently, the prosecutor should be 
ethically precluded from offering the defendant a plea deal if she knows 
that evidence critical to the prosecution case would be excluded if the 
case went to trial.38 In practice, however, if the prosecutor knows that 
something “went wrong” during the investigation and that key evidence 
may be (or: definitely is) inadmissible, she may indeed offer the defendant 
a particularly attractive deal so as not to lose the case altogether. 
That is a problem of prosecutorial ethics, but it may also lead to 
a legal issue: Can one say that a guilty plea is voluntary if the defendant 
wrongly assumes that the prosecution has admissible evidence sufficient 
to prove his guilt, while in fact key evidence is inadmissible? Take Case 
2 as an example again: If the defendant mistakenly thinks that his forced 
confession at the police station can be used against him at the trial and 
that he therefore does not have the slightest chance of being acquitted, 
and then pleads guilty – is that plea voluntary? One could argue that the 
defendant was not forced to plead guilty and that it was his free decision 
to waive the chance of an acquittal and to acknowledge his guilt. But 
doesn’t voluntariness presuppose having the information necessary 
to make an intelligent decision? One would probably not hesitate to 
invalidate a plea if the prosecutor had intentionally misled the defendant 
about the availability of incriminating evidence. But in some jurisdictions 
the defense is asked to plead without being given full access to relevant 
information. The prosecutor may have to disclose evidence that could be 
used by the defense in its favor at trial, but he need not grant the defense 
38 See Russell Gold, Beyond the Judicial Fourth Amendment: The Prosecutor’s 
Role, 47 UC Davis Law Review 1591-1665 (2014).
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lawyer discovery of incriminating evidence.39 If the prosecutor’s bag of 
evidence contains mainly inadmissible items, would it count as deception 
to even make a plea offer to the defense? 
The answers to that question may well differ, depending on 
each jurisdiction’s rules on the information that must be available to the 
defendant before he decides on the plea. But as a general rule, the defense 
should not be forced to plead “blind”; and in particular the defendant 
should be alerted to facts that might jeopardize the admissibility of 
prosecution evidence. Only if the defense lawyer is aware of the relevant 
facts concerning (potential) inadmissibility and still – based on his own 
assessment of these facts – advises his client to plead guilty, this may 
be regarded as a legitimate tactical choice and should be respected as a 
voluntary plea.40
One may have doubts, however, whether there can ever be a valid 
acceptance of the use of a forced confession as evidence. German law 
provides that a statement resulting from threats, force, deceit, or other 
prohibited means is inadmissible even if the defendant later consents to 
its use at trial.41 But even that strict standard only rules out the admission 
of such evidence at trial and does not prevent the defendant, after proper 
information about the inadmissibility of the prior statement,42 from 
making another confession to the same facts. Nor does the ban on using 
a forced confession stand in the way of the defendant acknowledging 
guilt, for which he may have independent reasons.
39 See, for the United States, the 2002 U.S. Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. 
Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 at 623 (“The Constitution does not require the Govern-
ment to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea 
agreement with a criminal defendant.”). See further Jenia I. Turner, Plea Bar-
gaining Across Borders, pp. 40-41 (2009).
40 There are strong arguments in favor of involving a judge in the plea negotia-
tion process; he could, among other things, make sure that crucial informa-
tion is not withheld from the defense lawyer. See on this issue Jenia I. Turner, 
Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiation: A Comparative View, 54 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 501-570 (2006).
41 § 136a sec. 3 German Code of Criminal Procedure.
42 On this requirement, see European Court of Human Rights, Gäfgen v. Ger-
many, case no. 22978/05, Judgment of 1 June 2010, § 182.
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3. PenAl orders And mInI trIAls
Finally, the question arises whether exclusionary rules have an 
impact on the various forms of abbreviated trials. To the extent that the 
judge actually takes evidence before making a decision, it is obvious that 
she must not use tainted evidence that would not be admissible at a full 
trial of the matter. But what about the proceeding in which the judge bases 
the decision only on the written record of the pretrial investigation? In 
that instance, taking judicial cognizance of the file of the investigation 
replaces the taking of evidence. The judge must consequently check 
the file to see whether certain evidence has been obtained illegally and 
would therefore be subject to exclusion. If that is the case, the judge must 
not base the decision on this evidence; she may consequently convict 
the defendant only if the remaining evidence apparent from the file is 
sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
But perhaps the judge’s use of evidence that would be inadmissible 
at a full trial might be legitimized by the defendant’s advance consent? 
In most jurisdictions, an abbreviated procedure is available only with the 
defendant’s consent. That consent does not refer to a finding of guilt (as 
in the guilty plea proceeding) but only to the judge’s authority to dispense 
with taking evidence and to rely instead on the information contained 
in the police file. But does the defendant’s consent then imply that the 
judge should be permitted to use any information she can find in the file, 
including illegally obtained evidence, or only such information as could 
also be introduced at trial? As a rule, the defendant’s consent should be 
interpreted as extending only to the results of an investigation conducted 
in accordance with applicable legal rules. Returning to example Case 2, the 
defendant’s declaration that the judge may issue a judgment based on the 
police file cannot be understood to extend to the confession extorted from 
him by the threat of force.43 This may be different only if the defendant 
and his lawyer were explicitly informed that the file contains evidence 
43 But see Art. 438 subsec. 6-bis Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, providing 
that the defendant’s request to conduct an abbreviated proceeding implies 
the waiver of certain rules of exclusion of evidence (nullità) except instances 
of “absolute” invalidity of the evidence. 
265
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, v. 7, n. 1, p. 247-271, jan.-abr. 2021. 
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v7i1.502 |
that is likely to be inadmissible and have nevertheless given consent to 
the use of that evidence.44 
The same standard should apply in the “penal order” type of 
proceeding. Although the prosecutor pre-formulates the judgment, the 
judge must not authorize it unless it is supported by the results of the 
investigation as documented in the file. This means that the judge is 
expected to read the file and examine what admissible evidence would be 
available at a trial. Only if, based on a summary evaluation, this evidence 
would be sufficient to support a finding of guilt may the judge issue the 
penal order. Even in this most abbreviated proceeding, then, the exclusion 
of evidence plays an important role: It removes illegally obtained evidence 
from the file on which the judge must base her decision on whether to 
issue the penal order as requested by the prosecutor. 
As with prosecutorial decisions, however, the virtual exclusion 
of evidence from the file is limited to clear cases. The judge has more 
leeway if the facts as they appear from the file are such that they require 
a balancing of conflicting interests before a decision on exclusion can be 
made. In that situation, the judge should conduct a provisional balancing 
based on the limited information available at the time, which may lead 
to acceptance of some evidence that might eventually be excluded after 
full argument at a trial.
In conclusion, it can be said that a judgment in an abbreviated 
proceeding (including a penal order) must in the normal course of events 
not be based on evidence that would be inadmissible at a regular trial.
vii. practical problEMs
Although these rules appear convincing in theory, there are 
obvious impediments to their application in practice. With regard to 
prosecutorial sanctioning (VI. 1. supra), the main problem lies in the 
lack of any exterior control on the prosecutor’s decision-making. The 
question whether the prosecutor takes the (possible) inadmissibility 
44 The defendant may be given an incentive to agree by a promise of an excep-
tionally lenient sentence.
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of evidence into account is entirely left to her conscientious review of 
the evidence and her readiness to dismiss a case without any sanction 
where the admissible evidence would not be strong enough to support 
a conviction. In theory, the defendant can obtain a judicial decision by 
rejecting an offer of, e.g., a conditional dismissal, but he will hardly 
be in a position at this stage to assess the strength of the (admissible) 
evidence against him and will therefore often not dare to refuse an offer 
of disposing of his case without a finding of guilt. 
With regard to abbreviated dispositions with a finding of guilt 
(such as penal orders), the most serious problem is the frequent lack of an 
active defense at this stage of the proceedings. Penal orders, for example, 
are mostly used in trivial non-serious cases in which the court does not 
appoint a lawyer for the defendant.45 And even if there is an abbreviated 
trial with a hearing before a judge, a defense lawyer may not necessarily 
take the trouble of studying the prosecution file (if it is available to her 
at all) but will concentrate on obtaining a lenient sentence for her client. 
The defense lawyer as the driving force in any argument against the 
admissibility of evidence will hence normally not be present or at least 
will not invest much energy in arguing these matters unless she expects 
the case to go to a full trial.46 
A further factor working against exclusion of evidence attaining 
practical relevance is inertia. The abbreviated forms of disposing of 
criminal cases have been invented for the very purpose of saving judges 
the effort and time needed for thoroughly reviewing the evidence. Judges 
will often unquestioningly rely on the police and the prosecution to have 
conducted a diligent investigation and to have abided by the law in doing 
so. Unless there are evident violations, or the judge has been alerted to 
potential evidence problems by the defense lawyer, the judge will assume 
that the investigation was conducted in accordance with the law and will 
45 For example, in Germany a lawyer must be appointed for the defendant only 
if a (suspended) prison sentence is to be imposed; § 407 subsec. 1, sent. 2 
German Code of Criminal Procedure.
46 In the U.S., the chance of a successful defense motion to suppress some ille-
gally obtained evidence may be a “bargaining chip” for the defense, leading 
to conviction with a reduced sentence. Cf. Slobogin (note 16, supra), at 375.
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accept the information contained in the file as a basis for his judgment.47 
Typically, in an abbreviated process there is no room for an adversarial 
discussion of issues of evidence law.
viii. possiblE solutions
What, then can be done to overcome the obstacles to arriving at a 
decision independently of inadmissible evidence? Two main approaches 
come to mind. 
First, defense counsel should actively participate in abbreviated 
proceedings. One of the lawyer’s functions is to familiarize herself with 
the information on the case and to alert the judge to possible evidence 
problems. Yet, although that demand is in line with an ideal system of 
criminal justice, it is not realistic to expect a lawyer to be appointed in every 
case, given the large number of petty cases processed in written form. 
It will thus mostly remain for the prosecutor or the judge to 
conscientiously check the materials at his disposal for possible procedural 
faults that may make evidence inadmissible. If such problems appear from 
the file, he must decide whether the remaining evidence is strong enough 
to carry a conviction. If the case has reached the stage of judicial decision-
making, there will be instances of doubt in which the judge cannot tell, 
from only reading the file, whether a procedural fault has occurred and 
whether it is serious enough to demand exclusion of the ensuing evidence. 
In this situation, the judge should either – where that is permissible – try 
to resolve that doubt by hearing individual witnesses who can clarify the 
matter or decline to decide the case in an abbreviated proceeding and 
instead set the case for trial. These obligations will undoubtedly make 
abbreviated dispositions a bit less attractive to practitioners. But since 
the judgment is issued in the judge’s name, he can well be expected to 
make sure that there is sufficient admissible evidence available to convict 
the defendant before he finds him guilty.
47 For criticism of the German „penal order” proceeding along these lines 
see Felix Bommer et al., Alternativ-Entwurf Abgekürzte Strafverfahren im 
Rechtsstaat, 166 Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht (2019) 1-128 at 84-85.
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ix. conclusion
The fact that evidence has been obtained illegally and therefore 
cannot be used at a trial has repercussions on the resolution of the case 
in informal criminal proceedings. 
First, prosecutors should not rely on inadmissible evidence when 
offering the suspect an informal disposition, for example, a dismissal of 
the case without a formal charge in exchange for the defendant making 
a payment. 
Second, a plea of guilty or a similar procedural declaration must 
be deemed involuntary and void if the defendant made it because he was 
misled about the admissibility of crucial incriminating evidence at the trial. 
Third, a judge in an abbreviated proceeding that leads to a 
finding of guilt must not base his decision on evidence that would not 
be admissible at a trial. Because defendants cannot normally themselves 
assess the admissibility of evidence, and since criminal justice officials 
may tend to seek a consensual shortcut to judgment without a thorough 
examination of the evidentiary situation, defense counsel should get 
involved, whenever possible, in checking the hypothetical admissibility 
of evidence and alerting prosecutors and judges to possible problems. 
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